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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Assembly, in its 1998 Session, enacted legisla-
tion dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amend-
ed, or repealed a number of sections of the Virginia Code. In
addition to the legislative changes, there were four Supreme
Court of Virginia opinions, one Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit opinion, one Bankruptcy Court opinion, and one ,Virginia
circuit court opinion during the period covered by this review,
all of which involved issues of interest to the general practitio-
ner as well as to the specialist in wills, trusts, and,,estates.
This article reports on all of these legislative and judicial devel-
opments.'
II. LEGISLATION
A. Uniform Probate Forms
At the request of the Standing Committee on Commissioners
of Accounts of the Judicial Council of Virginia, the 1997 Session
provided for the creation of a number of mandatory uniform
probate forms effective July 1, 1998.2 This process continued
into the 1998 Session and resulted in the four following manda-
tory forms.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. BA, 1965, College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they
will often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only.
2. This development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 1249, 1268-71 (1997).
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1. Inventory
Although the default rule in Virginia requires trustees of a
testamentary trust to make annual accountings to the commis-
sioner of accounts, as is true for all other court-appointed fidu-
ciaries, the inventory requirement imposed on this latter group
has not been applicable to testamentary trustees. As an inven-
tory is ordinarily the starting point in the accounting process,
the absence of an inventory for a testamentary trust has result-
ed in a certain awkwardness in the accounting process. To
eliminate- -this problem, section 26-12, the inventory statute,
was amended to require not only testamentary trustees but
"[e]very trustee who qualifies in the clerk's office" to file an
inventory with the commissioner of accounts.3 This inventory
must list all realty and personalty under the trustee's supervi-
sion and control, and it is due "within four months after the
first date that any assets are received.""
2. Fiduciary Accounting
As the accounting required of the administrators of an intes-
tate decedent's estate is primarily for the benefit of the estate's
distributees, section 26-20.1 eliminates the requirement for a
formal accounting if all of the distributees are also administra-
tors.5 Instead, such distributees may simply file "a statement
under oath that all known charges against the estate have been
paid, and that after the time required by law, the residue of
the estate has been delivered to the distributees." Section 26-
20.1 also provides a similar dispensation where all of the resid-
uary beneficiaries of a testate estate are also personal represen-
tatives, except that the required affidavit has to be accompa-
nied by vouchers showing satisfaction of any nonresiduary be-
quests.7 The 1998 amendment to section 26-20.1, applicable
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12(C) (Curn. Supp. 1998).
4. Id. Provision also is made for making a further inventory if the trustee re-
ceives any additional assets after filing the initial inventory. See id. § 26-12(E) (Cum.
Supp. 1998).
5. See id. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
6. Id.
7. See id.
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only to testate cases, requires that the required affidavit now
"include an itemized listing" of any nonresiduary bequests,
which must be "substantiated" and accompanied by required
vouchers!
3. List of Heirs
Section 64.1-134 requires the personal representative of every
decedent's estate, and the proponent of any will where there is
no qualification on the estate, to file a list of the decedent's
heirs in the clerk's office where the qualifying or propounding
occurs and iii the clerk's office for any other jurisdiction where-
in the decedent owned real estate at death.' Paralleling, the
1996 path t8 uniformity of probate documents, the 1998 amend-
ment deletes the statutorily mandated requirements for suchra
list and replaces them with a "list of heirs under oath in accor-
dance with a form provided to each clerk of court by the Office
of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court."0
4. Affidavit Relating to Intestate's Realty
As noted in the preceding paragraph, the list of heirs serves
in part as a link in the chain of title to the decedent's intestate
real estate. This list of heirs, however, can only be filed by a
decedent's personal representative or a proponent of the
decedent's will, and in some cases there are no probate proceed-
ings in connection with an estate." Section 64.1-135, on the
other hand, specifically provides for a title-related affidavit in
intestate cases that is similar to the list of heirs, but which can
be filed by any person having an interest in the decedent's real
estate.' Here again, the 1998 amendment provides for a uni-
8. Id. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
9. See id. § 64.1-134 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
10. Id. § 64.1-134 (Cum. Supp. 1998). This form differs from other probate forms
in the requirement that it be made under oath. The oath was believed to be impor-
tant in the present case because the list of heirs serves, to a certain extent, as a
link in the chain of title to intestate real estate and, for that reason, ought to be
executed with at least the same dignity as a deed to realty.
11. See id.
12. See id. § 64.1-135 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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form form for this affidavit to be developed by the Executive
Secretary of the Supreme Court.13
B. Fiduciary Administration-Inflationay Adjustments
Continuing the inflationary-adjustment work begun in
1996,14 the 1998 Session increased the ceiling applicable to the
following four fiduciary administration statutes from $5,000 to
$10,000: (i) clerk of court's permissive waiver of surety upon
the official bond of a fiduciary qualifying in the clerk's office;15
(ii) clerk of court's mandatory waiver of the inventory and ac-
counting requirement in a small estate where the fiduciary has
a claim as an heir, beneficiary or creditor that is larger than
the small estate;16 (iii) exemption of decedent's estate from
probate tax;7 and (iv) personal representative's -duty to file a
probate tax return. 8 While all other estate related legislation
from the 1998 Session became effective on July 1, 1998, these
provisions were passed as emergency legislation and, thus,
became effective on March 18, 1998, the day the bill was signed
by the Governor. 9
C. Document Interpretation-Meaning of Child and Related
Terms-Termination of Parental Rights
Although section 64.1-5.1,2o dealing with the determination
of parent-child relationships, has been located among the intes-
tate succession provisions of the Virginia Code since its incep-
13. See id. § 64.1-135 (Cum. Supp. 1998). In this case, however, the statute 'con-
tinues to spell out the substance that the form must contain instead of leaving this
to the discretion of the Executive Secretary. Briefly, the three requirements are as
follows: (i) a description of the decedent's realty within the particular jurisdiction, (ii)
a statement that the decedent died intestate, and (iii) the names and last known
addresses of the decedent's heirs. See id.
14. For a report on adjustments made in 1996, see Johnson, supra note 2, at
1254-56. For a report on adjustments made in 1997, see id. at 1263.
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
16. See id. § 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
17. See id. § 58-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
18. See id. § 58.1-1714 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
19. See Act of Mar. 18, 1998, ch. 117, 1998 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-4, 26-12.3, 58.1-1712, 58.1-1714 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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tion in 1978,21 its scope extends far beyond intestacy matters.
This statute is applicable whenever "for purposes of this ti-
tle ... [such a relationship] must be established to determine
succession by, through or from a person."22 One of the 1998
amendments clarifies and extends this section's scope provision
"for purposes of this title" by adding the following language: "or
for determining rights in and to property pursuant to any deed,
will, trust or other instrument."'
The second amendment to section 64.1-5.1 adds a new sub-
section containing a default rule for cases wherein residual
parental rights 'are terminated under section 16.1-2832' and
the court's order fails to address succession issues. In such a
casd, the rights of the parent to take from or through the child
are terminated but otherwise "the rights of the child, the child's
kindred, or the parent's kindred" are not affectedY
D. Spendthrift Trusts-Permissible Ceiling Increased
The $500,000 ceiling on spendthrift trusts that was estab-
lished in 198026 received an inflationary-adjustment increase to
$600,000 in 1996. 27 Somewhat surprisingly, the 1998 Session
further increased this ceiling to $1,000,000.'
21. For the background of this statute, see J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance Rights
of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 (1978).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). This section works in pari mate-
ria with section 64.1-71.1, dealing with the interpretation of wills and trusts, that
also was enacted in 1978. See id. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Section 64.1-71.1 re-
fers back to section 64.1-5.1 (by using the phrase the "rules for determining relation-
ships for purposes of intestate succession") for a default rule. Id.
23. Id. § 64.1-5.1 (Cune. Supp. 1998). This amendment 'also added the language
"or a taking" following the word "succession," in the phrase "to determine succession
or a taking by, through or from a person." Id. Although it is difficult to think of a
"taking" that would not also be included within the term "succession," this apparent
redundancy seems to be harmless.
24. Id. § 16.1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
25. Id. § 64.1-5.1(5) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
26. See Act of Mar. 22, 1980, ch. 267, 1980 Va. Acts 288 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Rpl. Vol. 1995)).
27. See Act of Mar. 31, 1996, ch. 397, 1996 Va. Acts 671 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
28. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
19981 1409
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E. Power of Attorney-Apparent Authority
When a principal terminates an agent's authority but does
not recover the power of attorney document, or when a princi-
pal terminates an agent's authority but does not communicate
that fact to persons with whom the agent has dealt previously
on the principal's behalf, the agent still possesses the appear-
ance of authority. Accordingly, Virginia law has protected inno-
cent third parties who rely upon such an agent's apparent au-
thority, in the "absence of fraud," if the agent executes an affi-
davit affirming the validity of the power." The problem with
this provision has been an uncertainty about the identity of the
person who must be free from fraud-the agent, the third par-
ty, or both. The 1998 amendment eliminates this problem by
replacing the phrase "absence of fraud" with new language
stating "absence of actual knowledge to the contrary on the
part of the person to whom such representations are made.""
F. Augmented Estate-Valuation of Insurance
Although it has been clear that life insurance generally is to
be included in a decedent's augmented estate,3 ' the Virginia
Code has provided no valuation rules for gifts -of insurance
policies or for the payment of premiums on polices owned by
another. Thus, a 1998 amendment to section 64.1-16.1 provided
for the value of a gifted policy to be the same as "the cost of a
comparable policy on the date of [the gift] or, if such a policy is
not readily available, the policy's interpolated terminal re-
serve."32 The amendment further provides that "[t]he value of
any premiums paid on an insurance policy owned by another
29. See id. § 11-9.2(b) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
30. Id. § 11-9.2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
31. Specifically, life insurance is treated similar to any of the decedents other
property "to the extent owned by, vested in, or subject to the control of the decedent
on the date of his death or the date of an irrevocable transfer by him during his
lifetime." Id. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
32. Id. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998). This language is based upon the federal
gift tax valuation rule found in Treas. Reg. § 25-2512-6(a) (as amended in 1974).
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person is the amount of the premiums only and not the insur-
ance purchased or maintained with such premiums."'
G. Minors' Tort Settlements-Trusts-Accountings
One of the options contained in section 8.01-424, dealing with
compromises of suits or actions on behalf of persons under a
disability, provide for payment on a minor's behalf to be made
into a trust for the minor instead of into a guardianship.' Al-
though the trust option provided a more flexible and efficient
property management vehicle than a guardianship, the trust
option had none of the guardianship's protections because there
was no statutory basis for bringing such a trust into Virginia's
fiduciary accounting process. The 1998 amendment eliminated
this concern, both for trusts being created and existing trusts
being augmented, by authorizing the court to make the trustee
"subject to the same duty to qualify in the clerk's office and to
file an inventory and annual accountings with the commissioner
of accounts as would apply to a testamentary trustee."35
H. Appraisement of Decedent's Estate
In the past, section 64.1-133 has provided for the clerk of
court, upon request of a decedent's personal representative or
on the clerk's own motion, to appoint three or more disinterest-
ed and competent persons to appraise the value of the
decedent's estate under the supervision and control of the per-
sonal representative.36 Although this procedure was helpful at
one tiiime in the past, it rarely has been used in recent years
and no longer was thought to be helpful even as a permissive
statute. Accordingly, the 1998 Session repealed this provi-
sion. 7
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
34. See id. § 8.01-4.24 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
35. Id. § 8.01-424(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998). The default rule of fiduciary accounting
already requires trustees of testamentary trusts-to file annual accountings with the
commissioner of accounts, but it was not until this year that the inventory require-
ment was made applicable to testamentary trusts. This development is noted in Sec-
tion H-4I1. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-133 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
37. See Act of Apr. 27, 1998, ch. 610, 1998 Va. Acts (repealing VA. CODE ANN. §
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I. Prudent Investor Rule-Life Insurance Policies-Fiduciary
Duties
One popular pattern for a tax-oriented estate plan involves
the creation of an inter vivos trust to serve as the major dispos-
itive and management vehicle for passage of the family wealth
to the next generation with the traditional will playing only a
supportive role. In this "receptacle trust-pourover will" ar-
rangement, it is normal to integrate all life insurance policies
into the plan by transferring their ownership to the trustee of
the inter vivos trust. Quite often, this insurance policy will be
the only asset of the trust during the settlor's lifetime and,
increasingly, questions are being asked concerning the trustee's
duties in regard thereto. In response to such concerns, the 1998
Session amended Virginia's prudent investor rule" to provide
certain protections for the trustee of any trust thatholds poli-
cies of life insurance. Generally, the legislation provides that
the trustee has no duty (i) to determine the appropriateness of
any policy as an investment, (ii) to dispose of any policy for
diversification reasons, or (iii) to exercise any policy options.3 9
Notwithstanding the specific limitation attached to these dis-
pensations, ° the new rule appears to be broader than neces-
sary for two reasons. First, it is applicable to all trusts,4' not
just to those described in the text where, in the ordinary case,
the trustee has no other assets. Second, it is not limited to
cases where the insurance policy in question is transferred to
the trust by the settlor; it also is applicable when the insurance
policy actually is purchased by the trustee.
64.1-133 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
39. See id. § 26-45.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
40. "However, apart from these specific authorities, this subsection is not intended
and shall not be construed to affect the application of the standard of judgment and
care as set forth in subsection A of this section." Id.
41. "This subsection shall apply to all trusts, regardless of when established." Id.
1412
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J. Trusts-Appointment of New Trustees by Court or
Beneficiaries
Section 26-48 deals with the court's authority to appoint a
new trustee in a variety of circumstances, one of which has
been when the incumbent trustee "removes beyond the limits of
the Commonwealth."42 One of the 1998 amendments to this
section adds the words "when residency is statutorily required"
immediately in front of this language.4" As residency has not
been statutorily required of trustees since July 1, 1997," the
amendment renders this provision meaningless. Parallel amend-
ments are made to the following two sections: (i) section 26-49,
which deals with the power of beneficiaries to appoint a new
.trustee if such. power is contained in the trust instrument,45
and (ii) section 26-51, which deals with the management of
trusts prior to the appointment of a new trustee.46
A further amendment to section 26-48 provides for the re-
placement of a corporate trustee of a trust being managed in
Virginia if the trustee moves its management function out of
the state and "if the court finds that the management of such
trust after such removal results in good cause for the substitu-
tion of such trustee."47 To the extent that the quoted language
does not effectively pull the teeth of this new replacement pro-
vision, the following sentence certainly does: "A corporate trust-
ee that maintains a place of business in the Commonwealth
where one or more trust officers are available on a regular ba-
sis for personal contact with trust customers or beneficiaries
shall not be deemed to have removed such management func-
tion."48 Nevertheless, in light of several mergers of Virginia
and North Carolina banks in recent years, the amendment
42. Id. § 26-48 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
43. Id. § 26-48 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
44. For a discussion of this development, see Johnson, supra note 2, at 1249-51.
45. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-49 (Cure. Supp. 1998).
46. See id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-48 (Cum. Supp. 1998). In such a case, section 26-51 is
amended to provide for the corporate trustee being replaced to continue its manage-
ment function until the court appoints a new trustee pursuant to section 26-48. See
id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
48. Id. § 26-48 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
19981 1413
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should serve as a statement of concern by the General Assem-
bly for the interests of the Virginia customers of the newly
merged banks and a diplomatic warning of stronger measures
to follow, if necessary.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act--Jurisdiction
In Smith v. Smith,49 the father purchased bonds in his
name as the custodian for his daughter under the Virginia
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.5" The father left the bonds
on deposit with his broker and, according to the daughter's
allegations, later converted them to his own use. 1  The
daughter's uncontroverted evidence, however, showed that, al-
though "Virginia" .was used as the state designation on these
bonds, all of the parties were residents of the District of Colum-
bia when the transaction occurred and that also was where the
bonds were located. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs case based upon a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.52
49. 254 Va. 99, 487 S.E.2d 212 (1997).
50. The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-26 to -36 (Repl. Vol.
1997), was in force in Virginia at the time these bonds were acquired. This Act, how-
ever, was repealed in 1988 and replaced with the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-37 to -59 (Repl. Vol. 1997), which is applicable to existing
custodianships. See id. § 31-58 (Repl. Vol. 1997). This development is discussed in J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 22 U.
RICH. L. REv. 759, 768-71 (1988).
51. Interestingly, the court notes that the father, who was called as an adverse
witness, testified that
when he established the account [with the broker], he did not make a
gift to [his daughter] and that he explicitly told his broker "not to do
anything with respect to a gift or any sort of gift act." Rather, [the fa-
ther] stated that he had directed his broker to purchase the bonds and
structure the transaction so that the bonds would be taxed at his
daughter's lower rate of income taxation.
254 Va. at 102, 487 S.E.2d at 214. The court, however, does not discuss the possible
ramifications of these facts to which it calls attention.
52. See id. at 106, 487 S.E.2d at 216. Where 'Virginia" is the designated state in
an attempted transfer under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, the transaction
can be recognized only "if, at the time of the transfer, the transferor, the minor, or
the custodian is a resident of [Virginia] or the custodial property is located in [Vir-
ginia]." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-38 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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B. Wills-Right of Contribution-Doctrine of Election
In Pickett v. Spain,53 the husband's will directed his execu-
tor to pay his "just debts, excluding any mortgage indebtedness
on [the] home for which [his] wife and [he] are jointly liable,
even though [his] home passes to her by survivorship."' The
trial court, however, allowed the wife, who was a beneficiary
under her husband's will, to receive contribution from her
husband's estate for one-half of this indebtedness. On appeal,
the estate argued that the wife's voluntary acceptance of bene-
fits under her husband's will amounted to an election barring
her otherwise clear right of contribution. Affirming the trial
court, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that,"[hiere,
the doctrine of election simply has no application."55
C. Wills-Estate Taxes-Insufficient Residue-Apportionment
In Stickley v. Stickley,"6 the issue before the Supreme Court
of Virginia was "whether an article in a will, which directs all
estate taxes and administration expenses to be paid out of the
residuary estate, avoids apportionment of the remaining estate
taxes upon depletion of the residuary estate." 7 The result of
53. 254 Va. 107, 487 S.E.2d 233 (1997).
54. Id. at 108, 487 S.E.2d at 234.
55. Id. at 110, 487 S.E.2d at 235. In an earlier part of this opinion the supreme
court noted that "in order to make a case of election it is equally well settled that
the intention of the testator to give that which is not his own must be clear and
unmistakable." Id. (quoting Waggoner v. Waggoner, 111 Va. 325, 328, 68 S.E. 990,
991-92 (1910)).
The common law doctrine of election would be applicable if, for example, the
husband purported to devise this survivorship property to X, and also made his wife
,a beneficiary under his will. In such a case, where the husband is clearly trying to
dispose of that which is not his own (the survivorship property), the wife would be
put to an election to (i) stand on her legal right to the survivorship property and
forfeit her benefits under the will, or (ii) allow X to take the survivorship property
and receive her benefits under the will.
Beyond the common law doctrine of election, a testator also specifically may
put a beneficiary to an election between alternative rights or provisions. On this
point, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the husband "did not
use language . . .which evinces a clear intention to require his [wife] to make an
election between her right of contribution and any benefit she may receive under the
will." 254 Va. at 110, 487 S.E.2d at 235.
56. 225 Va. 405, 497 S.E.2d 862 (1998).
57. Id. at 407, 497 S.E.2d at 862. The provision in question, Article One of the
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an affirmative answer is that such taxes should be a general
charge against the remaining probate estate assets. Noting that
the testator had provided for funeral expenses, debts, costs of
administration, and estate taxes to be treated the same, i.e., to
be paid from the residuary estate, the supreme court concluded
that "[a]n insufficient residuary estate does not change that
intent.""8 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the remaining estate taxes should not be appor-
tioned equitably pursuant to the statute59 in this case but
should be treated as a general charge against the remaining
probate estate.6°
D. Wills-Execution-Capacity
The issue before the court in Fields v. Fields61 was whether
the testator had the requisite testamentary capacity at the time
he executed the document that was offered for probate as his
will. Applying settled law to the unique facts of this case, the
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court and directed
that the document be admitted to probate.62
testator's will, reads as follows:
All estate, inheritance, and other death taxes including interest and pen-
alties together with the expenses of my last illness and all administra-
tion expenses including an appropriate marker for my grave, payable in
any jurisdiction by reason of my death, (including those taxes and ex-
penses payable with respect to assets which do not pass under this will)
shall be paid out of and charged generally against the principal of my
residuary estate. I waive any right of reimbursement for or recovery of
those death taxes and administration expenses.
Id. at 407, 497 S.E.2d at 863.
58. Id. at .409, 497 S.E.2d at 864. The supreme court further noted that "the
Testator's intent to avoid apportionment of his estate taxes, even if the residuary
estate is depleted, is further evidenced by his waiver, in Article One of any right of
recovery of the estates [sic] taxes." Id. at 410, 497 S.E.2d at 864. This "right of re-
covery" language to which the court refers is set forth, in context, in the immediately
preceding footnote.
59. The default rule of section 64.1-161, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161 (Repl. Vol.
1995), provides for the burden of estate taxes to be apportioned equitably among the
takers of the taxable estate, but section 64.1-165, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165 (Repl.
Vol. 1995), allows one to avoid this result by making a contrary provision.
60. See 255 Va. at 410, 497 S.E.2d at 864.
61. 255 Va. 546, 499 S.E.2d 826 (1998).
62. See id. at 551, 499 S.E.2d at 829.
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E. Wills-Federal Court-Jurisdiction
The case of Turja v. Turja' is an excellent review of "the
venerable, but infrequently discussed, probate exception to a
federal court's diversity jurisdiction."" In an action attacking
the validity of the decedent's will and inter vivos trust, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized federal di-
versity jurisdiction over the inter vivos trust but concluded that
"a federal court does not gain jurisdiction to determine a will's
validity merely because the issue is 'incidental' to other
claims."65
F. Spendthrift Trusts-Accrued Income-Bankruptcy
The issue in In re Pearson' was "whether income [sic] that
has accrued to the debtor but remains in the hands of the
Trustee of the Trust is protected by the spendthrift provisions
of the Trust. 7 Although Virginia law does not allow creditors
to reach a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust,' the
issue of a creditor's access to a beneficiary's interest in trust
principal that is immediately payable on the beneficiary's de-
mand, but which has not yet been distributed by the trustee,
remains undecided by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The
Bankruptcy Court concluded that protection of the spendthrift
trust in such a case would continue "until the principal is no
longer in the hands of the trustee."" However, as the debtor's
63. 118 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1997).
64. Id. at 1007. The basic rule states:
[A] federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an
estate . . . federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits "in
favor of creditors; legatees and heirs" and other claimants against a
decedents estate "to establish their claims" so long as the federal court
does not interfere with the probate or assume general jurisdiction of the
probate or control of the property in the custody of the state court.
Id. at 1009 (quoting Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)).
65. Id. at 1008.
66. 212 B.R. 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
67. Id. at 132. Though the court used the word "income" when stating the issue,
it is clear from the facts, opinion, and holding that the court focused upon the "prin-
cipal" of the trust.
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
69. 212 B.R. at 132.
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interest in the trust before the court "far exceeds" the limita-
tion allowable under Virginia law0 and as such excess is
clearly reachable by the trustee in bankruptcy, the court noted
that its analysis "appears to be purely academic."7'
G. Fiduciary Compensation-Reasonableness-Bank Fee
Schedule
The statutory basis for an executor's compensation in Virgin-
ia is section 26-30, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he
commissioner... shall allow the fiduciary ... except in cases
in which it is otherwise provided, a reasonable compensation, in
the form of a commission on receipts or otherwise."72 The theo-
ry undergirding this rule is the assumption that the commis-
sioner, as an experienced practitioner in this area of the law,
can review the file in a given case and determine what would
be reasonable in light of its specific facts.73 Corporate fiducia-
ries, however, have determined that they wish to take this
matter out of the commissioner's hands by making their execu-
torial fee a matter of agreement with their customer. Indeed, in
the ordinary case, a corporate fiduciary will not agree to serve
as an executor unless the will contains a compensation clause,
such as, for example, the following standard clause found in In
re Estate of Fine: "For its services, the bank, or its successor,
shall receive the compensation stipulated in its regularly pub-
lished fee schedule in effect at the time such compensation be-
comes payable."4
Notwithstanding the presence of this clause, the commission-
er of accounts refused to allow the bank the amount of compen-
70. This limitation, -which was $500,000 at the time this case was brought, was
increased to $1,000,000 in 1998. See supra Section H.D.
71. 212 B.R. at 132.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-30 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
73. There is a reasonable factual basis to conclude that the system does not in
fact operate in this idealistic fashion in the typical decedents estate. Instead, one
finds that the typical commissioner has developed a fee schedule based upon a per-
centage of the assets under the personal representative's supervision and control, and
the commissioner routinely allows compensation in this amount. Only in cases where
beneficiaries might object to the compensation claimed, or where a personal represen-
tative claims a higher amount than routinely allowed, does the commissioner of ac-
counts become actively involved in fee determinations.
74. 41 Va. Cir. 597, 598 (Norfolk City 1995).
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sation provided for in its fee schedule. On appeal to the circuit
court, the bank argued that the commissioner did not have any
authority to review its fee because it had been fixed by the tes-
tator as allowed by the case of Williams v. Bond.75 The Nor-
folk Circuit Court, however, affirmed the decision of its commis-
sioner and held that under these facts
the testator did not fix the executor's compensation ...
[Nleither he nor [the Bank] had any way of knowing what
those fees would be in futuro. There were no limitations on
the fee, and [the Bank], in its sole discretion, was free to
change its published schedule of fees at any time for any
reason.
Absent a clear, definite provision setting the compensa-
tion of an executor, the Court had not only the authority
but also the duty to inquire as to the reasonableness of the
executor's compensation.7"
What impact this case may have on fiduciary compensation
practices of Virginia's banks, on compensation review issues be-
fore other commissioners, and on drafting practices of estates'
lawyers, remains to be seen.
IV. CONCLUSION
The estate-related legislation enacted during the 1998 Session
of the General Assembly is significantly smaller in volume and
significance than that enacted in recent years. However, a num-
ber of bills of significant importance that were introduced in
the 1998 Session were not defeated but, instead, were carried
over for action in the 1999 Session. Included within -this num-
ber were the following proposals: (i) to enact the Uniform Pru-
dent Investor Act,77 (ii) to enact the Uniform Principal and
Income Act,78 (iii) to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities in
some instances,79 and (iv) to revise the laws relating to joint
75. 120 Va. 678, 91 S.E. 627 (1917).
76. 41 Va. Cir. at 598-99 (emphasis added).
77. See H.B. 841, Va. Gem. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
78. See ILB. 842, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
79. See H.B. 645, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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bank accounts. 0 Taking into account the amount of carryover
legislation from 1998, and the amount of legislation that might
normally be expected to be introduced in a given session, the
1999 Session of the General Assembly promises to be a signifi-
cant one for estates matters.
80. See H.B. 944, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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